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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops a model about the political factors Australian businesses should consider when entering 
China, and then empirically examines the issues by interviewing representatives .fi'om 40 companies who have 
operations in China. The political dimension in this paper comprises the political system, political barriers and 
risk, relationships with government, Australian government assistance, and Chinese government assistance. We 
then looked at whether these components of politics influenced ently modes, as stated by our interviewees. We 
found that political barriers effected entry mode choice, while the remainder of components of politics 
influenced business implementation and operation. 
INTRODUCTION 
China's move into the global economy since 1979 has seen an influx of capital in the form of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) (Yeung, 2000). China has become Australia's 21st largest investment destination. In 2006 
there was $3 billion worth of investment from Australian businesses (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DF AT), 2007). Despite the attraction of China large marketplace it is not a straight forward market to invest in 
(Chung, 2006a). Among many influencing factors, the political environment has been a challenging area for 
foreign investors and cannot be under estimated especially in China because of its one party dominated central 
administration system and "socialist market economy" (Hu, 2008). The question of this paper is how does the 
political dimension of China influence Australian businesses' entry mode decisions to China, and their related 
strategies. We created a model ofthe factors related to politics that we hypothesized could influence entry modes 
(See Figure I). 




Relationships with the government 
Australian Government Assistance 
Chinese Government Assistance 
Entry Mode 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Levy (1995) explains that foreign investors will face different levels of intervention, according to their 
foreignness. So investors who are highly foreign, (i.e. U.S., Australia and Europe), will find themselves with 
tighter controls, more stringent obligations, and monitoring then closer foreign investors, such as those from 
Hong Kong, Taiwan or Singapore. This will result in different investment outcomes, depending on the level of 
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foreignness (Walsh, Wang & Xin, 1999). Similar to this, Australian firms will want to reduce their resource 
commitments, and hence risk because of the level of foreignness that they perceive of the Chinese environment. 
We suggest that consistent with intemationalisation theory (Johansson & Vahlne, 1977), firms will increase their 
resource commitment as their level of knowledge, and understanding of the foreign environment increases. The 
literature on the intemationalization process describes the sequence of market entry that firms follow when 
intemationalizing. This sequence reflects a gradual, leaming through experience process (Johansson & Valhne, 
1977). Researchers have suggested that entering countries that are "psychically close" reduces the level of 
uncertainty firms face in the new market; and for countries that are "psychically close" it is easier for companies 
to leam about (Kogut & Singh 1988). The greater the closeness, the less risk that firms perceive when making an 
investment decision. For the purposes of this paper we define psychic distance as "a firm's degree of uncertainty 
about a foreign market resulting from cultural differences and other business difficulties that present barriers to 
leaming about the market and operating there" (O'Grady & Lane, 1996, p. 330). Given that, we expect that 
Australian businesses due to their foreignness from China, will face difficult investment outcomes, and will 
hence use entry modes that entail less risk, because the environment, and especially the political environment, 
examined in the paper, is "psychically distant" from Australia. 
The Chinese Political System 
The way a nation is govemed by the people and institutions in power, and the relationships between them is 
known as its political system. According to the Chinese Constitution, The People's Republic of China is a 
socialist state under the people's democratic dictatorship (The State Council 2004). It is a one party state, 
dominated by the Chinese Communist Party since 1949 (Linong, 2006). Political reforms have been gradualist in 
approach, and less dramatic than its economic reforms (Linong, 2006). This is different to Australia's democratic 
system, and minimal involvement and intervention of the govemment in business. Given the "psychic distance" 
between the political system in Australia, compared to China, it would be expected that firms would choose 
entry modes that require less equity, and that they would develop strategies for China that take into account the 
differences in political systems. 
Political Barriers and Risk 
For this paper we define any govemmental policy, attitude or action that blocks or prevents Australian 
businesses from participating in free trade with China political barriers. Policies stem from protecting industries, 
or discouraging and restricting trade in particular areas. These are influential, as a policy may regulate that a 
business needs to setup as a joint venture or are not allowed to participate in the Chinese market place in full 
form. There are many definitions of political risk, but for the purposes of this paper we use the definition by 
Root (1972) who defines it as "any political occurrence, of any kind (such as war, revolution, coup d'etat, 
expropriation, taxation, currency devaluation, exchange controls, and import restrictions) at home or abroad that 
can cause a loss of profit potential and/or assets in an intemational business operation" (p.355). Scholars have 
recently emphasized that political hazards are a primary determinant of the likelihood of entry (Kobrin, Basek, 
Blank & La Palombara, 1980). Similar to psychic distance, where the credibility of policy is low, firms minimize 
commitments to a market, or avoid investment. Hence, political risks or hazards will influence entry modes into 
China. Past research finds that in countries where the political environment is stable the firm should opt for 
equity based ventures, where it is politically unstable firms should opt for a mode that does not require equity 
(Root, 1987). Hence, we suggest for our study that any political risk in China, will influence the entry mode 
chosen by Australian finns, and will also influence the strategies, operations and policies that the firm pursues. 
Relationships with Government 
Relationships with the govemment has a significant level of importance when doing business in China due to the 
nature of its political system and its govemmental structure (Chung, 2006a). We suggest that Australian finns 
who have had no experience in China would not have an understanding of the level of involvement the 
govemment has in business. Prior to economic reform all enterprises were government owned. In more recent 
years, state enterprises were privatized and a large number of private enterprises established (El Kahal, 2005). 
Despite this trend, the government at all levels still control policies as well as influence company processes. In 
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the case of many Australia-China joint ventures, the Chinese patiners are often a section or department of a 
government body, for instance enterprises owned by the Ministry of Light Industry were all state owned 
enterprises (El Kahal, 2005). 
Australian Government Assistance 
In assisting firms to internationalize, there is a wide body of knowledge that examines expOli and trade 
promotion and assistance. Seringhaus & Rosson (1990) suggest that assistance usually comprises (1) expOli 
service programs, such as seminars for potential exporters, export counseling, how-to-expOli handbooks, and 
export financing, and (2) market development programs, such as dissemination of sales leads to local firms, 
participation in trade shows, preparation of market analysis, and export newsletters. 
The rapid development of Chinese economy and the ever changing trade relationships between Australia and 
China have seen the Australian government putting more and more emphasis on assisting two way trade with 
China (DFAT, 2005). Various federal bodies such as Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and 
Austrade promote Australian businesses in all areas of business activities (DF AT, 2007). Austrade has a number 
of export grants which assist Australian firms, especially SMEs in their exporting activities in China. At the state 
level Invest Victoria and AusIndustry also provide grants and assistance to Australian firms (Invest Victoria, 
2007). Invest Victoria has an office in Shanghai which provides Victorian businesses free office facilities and 
services. At local city government level, many city councils have sister city relationships with Chinese cities. For 
instance, Melbourne City has a sister city relationship with Tianjin as well as a representative office, where 
services and facilities are provided. We suggest that this type of assistance given by the Australian government 
will smooth the implementation of Australian businesses, operation in this country. 
Chinese Government Assistance 
Similar to Australian Government assistance, we also suggest that the assistance provided by the Chinese 
government for Australian businesses in China is important. We suggest that this support lent to the companies 
by the Chinese government will reduce the risk that these firms face, hence influencing their investment 
decisions, and their entry mode. We suggest that the change of the Joint Venture Law in 2006 and the variety of 
local governments' policies make this suggestion more essential. We expect that this support given by the 
Chinese government will result in a successful outcome for Australian businesses. 
Having covered the literature relating to the various components of the politics, we will now empirically 
examine this dimension, through interviews with Australian businesses in China. 
THE STUDY ON AUSTRALIAN BUSINESSES IN CHINA 
Our study was conducted from August 2007 until December 2007 with the support of the Australia China 
Business Council (ACBC). Respondents were recmited through the ACBC list and through the researchers' 
personal contacts. Invitations to participate were emailed to ACBC members. For non-response, follow up phone 
calls were made to encourage participation. We also used the snowballing method of interview participant 
recmitment (Burgess, 1987), where we asked interviewees whether they would identify other potential 
interviewees from other companies. These people were then contacted. After individuals had agreed to 
participate, the aims and background of the study were explained, and confidentiality and anonymity were 
assured to participants. A time was made to conduct the interviews. Interviews mainly took place at the 
interviewee's office. Interviews lasted approximately an hour, and were tape recorded and transcribed by a 
transcriber. Three participants wished not to have their interviews taped and detailed notes were taken. A total of 
42 interviews were conducted in 40 Australian Companies. A qualitative approaching to interview analysis was 
taken where transcripts were examined for themes and important events, decisions or occurrences. These form 
the findings of our study which will be presented over the following sections. Verbatim quotes are used to 
highlight these themes. 
The sample 
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The sample consisted of finn's mainly in the manufacturing industry (10 out of 40). Other common industries 
included Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (3), Building, Constmction and Engineering (4), Business and 
Property Services (4), and Education (4) (See Table 1). We also examined entry mode the firms used (See Table 
2). The more popular entry modes included Joint Venture Strategy (17), Wholly-Owned Foreign Entity (WOFE) 
(10), Exporting (4), or Project or Client based (4). 
T bill d t ' t d a e : n us ry  s represen e T bl 2 E t M d a e : n ry o e 
Industry Firms Market Entry Number 
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants 1 Acquisition 1 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 3 Exporting 4 
Building Constmction and Engineering 3 Foreign Direct Investment 2 
Business and Property Services 4 Joint Venture 17 
Education 4 Licensing Venture 2 
Finance and Insurance 4 Project or Client based 4 
Government Administration & Defence 3 Contract Manufacturing 1 
Information Technology 2 Used Agents 2 
Legal 1 Virtual institution 2 
Manufacturing 10 Wholly-Owned Foreign Entity 10 
Medical 1 Total 44 
Mining 1 
Publishing 1 
Transport and Storage 2 
Total 40 
RESULTS 
For political system we asked our respondents how the political system influenced their strategies for entering 
the Chinese market and operations. Dimensions that respondents mentioned included the political system, 
political barriers, political risk, relationships with the government, the support provided by the Australian 
Government and the Chinese government. The following are the major findings from this section. 
Political System 
We suggested that the political system will influence the operation of Australian businesses in China. To 
support this point a logistics business in China with a WOFE noted how China's "legacy from the past" was 
still apparent today and impacted on their operations "1 think it'sjust afimction of where they've comeji'om 
and their sort of political land~cape. And ours - we're coming from quite different models in terms of 
communism and democracy. So there are elements of that, that 1 would say there are significant differences ". 
A resources company who exports iron ore and coal to China commented on the control the government had 
in the market place which effected how their industry and business operated and the profits they make: 
"There are issues in China, but what do they look like? One is about the desire of the Chinese government to 
insert itself into the marketplace ... the general point is the role of government in markets and pricing in iron-
are negotiations ". 
An automotive company, who supplies components to car companies in China, also commented on the high 
level of control and involvement the government has in businesses in China: 
So much of China '.I' inji'astructure and industfJl is state owned ..... So for us, ABC Automobile, aliI' main 
customer, is state owned - mainly by the Province, but also by the local government, but ultimately they 
are answerable through to the state. And in the hierarchy, in the Western world, the guy who is the CEO 
of General Motors is king. But when you go to Wu Hu, the guy who is the CEO and chairman of ABC 
Automobile is actually the number 2 or 3 or 4 in the hierarchy. The local mayor is actually his boss. Then 
the local Communist Party Chairman is actually his boss ... and the role of government is far greater there 
than it is here - certainly in the areas where we've looked to invest. 
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A publishing company echoed the govemment intervention in their business. They commented that media 
content had to be approved by the govemment or bought into line with views held by the Ministry of 
Propaganda. This publisher had initially decided on a licensing strategy with a local producer, and would 
decide later if that was successful, they would proceed with a WFOE. The comments are interesting as 
reforms would imply that the supervising power of the Govemment in terms of propaganda would have been 
eroded. In fact, Linong (2006) suggests that the Chinese govemment have been relaxing controls on media 
and public opinion. While this may be the case, the above suggests to the contrary. 
Political Barriers and Risk 
Our participants also talked about the effect of political barriers and how that impacted on what they could do. 
For instance, changed approval processes for foreign universities are a way that the Chinese govemment controls 
the number of foreign players in the Chinese market. This meant that the foreign universities could not be 
involved in partnership programs, but had to filter students to Australia instead, and long approval process made 
it difficult for them to do business there. In this case changing approval processes influenced entry modes. The 
following quote is indicative of this: "If not for all of the universities in China, and mainly because of all the 
regulatOlY restrictions, there is only so much that foreigners can do on their own. So in that regard, we are 
restricted to using representatives over there who have got licenses issued by the Chinese government. " 
A law firm mentioned that the Chinese govemment still restricts what they did and then hence, how they were 
perceived by Chinese consumers. They were restricted on their ability to employ Chinese lawyers, and their 
ability to call themselves a Chinese law firm. They were seen as a foreign law firm. This type of a perception has 
a marketing implication for their business. A bank also mentioned how they were not too concemed about short 
term political events, such as political risk, rather they were concemed about how the processes developed by the 
Govemment associated with business operation affected their business. Other businesses also talked about the 
need to influence the govemment in China to get things done that they wanted. For example an Australian Bank 
in China talked about how unfavourable banking regulations for foreign firms made it difficult for them to set up 
in the form that they wanted to. A logistics business faced barriers that made them do things they would not 
normally need to do. For example, the law in Shenzhen required the firm to have an accountant to get invoices 
and paperwork done, which was not practically required by the firm. These differences meant that this firm 
needed to have "a lot of understanding, tolerance, and patience" to deal with bureaucratic rules laid down by the 
govemment. Further evidence of govemment interference was apparent, as a building firm had to get Chinese 
govemment approval for designs. In fact, the govemment dictated that foreign firms need to use local designers, 
and the firm suggested that it would make their life so much easier if they did not have this requirement. 
Our participants also talked about political risk, and the general finding from the study was that it was not an 
issue for them. A university informant stated that they thought that China was very stable for what they wanted 
to do. The law firm also agreed with this, and suggested that they saw China as stable, but that all foreign 
countries had some sort of sovereign risk associated with them. On the other hand a university did suggest that 
they faced political risk in China, as the following comments states, "1 suppose there is a lot of risk involved, 
particularly where you are so vulnerable to the decisions of the government". In summary, the major findings of 
this section are that political risk is not a salient issue as perceived by the interviewees. We therefore suggest that 
our data did not capture the effect of political risk on the choice of entry mode, for the firms examined. 
Relationships with the Government 
In line with the "Guanxi" concept, participants noted the importance of having relationships with the 
govemment. A resources finn noted that the relationships between their senior management team, and the 
Chinese govemment; 'There is quite a lot of interaction, 1 think, between the top of our business and the 
Chinese government". On a different note, an architectural firm mentioned that they believed it would have 
helped them to be more aware of relationships that existed so as not to stand on other people's toes. A 
representative of a company that produces automotive components talked about how it was important for 
them to have both relationships, and a large enough investment in China to facilitate their business: 
1 have guys whose companies have been up therefor 4 years prior to us and we have some of them 
coming asking us how did we get this done quickly. Again, 1 get back to government relationships, the 
confidence you have in the people you're dealing with, and in the end, it's personal. For us to go lip there 
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we had to have US$29 million - not greater than $30 million because then it has to go back to Central 
Government. So we had $29.5 million. You have to be above $25 million investment to get a reasonable 
position in the pecking order in the government structure. There's no point going tlying to see the mayor 
if you 're only putting $5 million in. 
A manufacturer of vats found that it was also important to have some connection with the government, 
through contacts as articulated in the following point: 
Our Chairman had a former colleague who had over quite a long period of time, done quite a bit of 
business in China, quite well connected and happened to know a number of senior city officials in the city 
of Quanzhou. He was able to introduce us to those officials who were then able to arrange introductions 
to the management of a number of engineering factories that might perhaps be partnersfor liS to work 
with. And we.finished up with a joint venture partner as a result of that process. 
The findings in regard to this section suggest that it is important to develop relationships with the government 
and to make an adequate investment in China, to obtain priority in government decisions, so as to 
successfully facilitate business operation. 
Australian Government Assistance 
Participants also talked about the effect of getting the Australian government to negotiate for them, and said 
despite their assistance that often did not help much, as the following bank mentioned: Austrade can help once 
you get in by directing business in your direction and we always had a close relationship. An individual from the 
same bank also suggested that the relationship Melbourne had with Tianjin made it helpful for them to setup 
their bank: 
The Melbourne and Tial?jin sister-city relationship helped, because there is a direct relationship between 
our mayor and their mayor. Our mayor speaks Chinese, Mandarin, so that helped. But I think at the end 
of the day, we were velY certain about what we were looking for in a partner, and they were VelY certain 
about what they were lookingfor in a partner. And so it just came together quite well. 
An Australian University talked about the confusing support that various Australian Government 
Departments provided to universities, and how they did not know who to go when seeking marketing support 
in China: "There is great contz/sion between what AEI does, what IDP does, what Austrade does, and to some 
extent these State Government business offices. They are all out there doing their own thing. We have been 
talking about this for ages. And the Australian government just can't get its act together on this. It just 
can't. ",," This suggests that the Australian government needs to work out how will offer its services to the 
University sector so that it is not confusing for Universities nor wasting taxpayer's money. An exporter of 
plants also suggested that it was important to use Austrade in identifying partners, however they pointed out 
that they were not always positive about Austrade's services. These findings suggest that it important to get 
Austrade's assistance before venturing into China. It was noted that Austrade was not always successful in 
doing so, and this needed to be taken into consideration when firms devise strategies for China. 
Chinese Government Assistance is Important. 
Our participants also talked about the assistance provided by the Chinese government, and how that was 
important for their implementation of their business venture. As the following resources company pointed out: I 
know the Tianjin municipal government was quite helpful, from my understanding, with our investment there. 
The people running Suzhou Industrial Park, as we mentioned, have been very, vefY helpfid A dairy company 
talked about how it was important that the government assisted with developing the dairy industry for them. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results of the study find that an understanding of politics is important when considering entry modes to 
China. Our data did not capture that the political dimension influenced entry modes, as to what our theoretical 
perspective on internationalisation (Johansson & Vahlne, 1977) would suggest. For instance, a firm has decided 
on its entry mode, i.e. a lV, and would use political connections to obtain this strategy. It was not the case, that 
China is "psychically distant" from Australia, a business chooses a less risky entry mode. It was found that 
government intervention was strong in Australian businesses in China, which meant that businesses needed to 
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understand this and incorporate that into the way they operated. In summary, the political system did not affect 
entry modes, but did effect operations. 
In terms of political ban-iers, participants confirmed that rules the government created effected what they did 
there. I-Ience, the political ban-iers were more influential on the type of mode that businesses choose. As our 
participants barely mentioned political risk, we believe that this was not a salient issue for the participants of our 
study, nor influenced their entry mode. 
Similar to the work on culture in China international business research, Australian businesses identified that 
connections, relationships; and "Guanxi" with Government facilitated them getting their operations up and 
running. This has been suggested by other researchers (i.e. Chung, 2006a; Linong, 2006). Participants did not 
specify they tried to influence the government through connections to get the type of entry mode they wanted. 
Instead they would use relationships to lever and implement the strategy chosen. Our participants mentioned 
assistance provided by the Australian Government and Austrade, which did not explain entry mode, but assisted 
with business operation and implementation. This point is further emphasized by the fact that a firm said they 
had already decided on their model, and they used Austrade to help them find partners. For the University 
sector, there was confusion as to what Australian Government bodies provided support to Australian 
Universities, and suggestions were made for improvement of this. Participants also found that assistance 
provided by the Chinese government did not influence entry modes rather it assisted with business 
implementation. In conclusion, our main findings from this analysis of 40 companies, was that politics effected 
entry modes, in as much as the Chinese government created the rules for whether the firm was allowed to have a 
WOFE, or had to use a JV strategy, or use licensing or agents, depending on the industry. Our expectation would 
have been that the political system, and the uncertainty operating in that type of political system, would make 
firms choose entry modes that reduces risk and resources commitment, as per internationalization theory 
(Johansson & Vahlne, 1977) and the "psychic distance" concept (O'Grady & Lane, 1996). But clearly, as 
participants did not see high levels of political risk, this did not affect entry modes, but effected their operations. 
This was the same for other components. In conclusion, we redeveloped our model of the dimensions of politics, 
and the influences each had on entry modes, and operations. This model is presented in Figure 2: 




Relationships with the government 
Australian Government Assistance 
Chinese Government Assistance 
Entry Mode 
Implementation of Business 
and Operations 
In summary it can be seen that political barriers have an influence on entry modes, but that other dimensions of 
politics, such as the political system itself, political risk, relationships with the government, Australian 
government assistance, and Chinese government assistance, helps firms in implementing their business, and 
influences they way they operate. We argued, that Australian businesses need to have an understanding of these 
components of politics, to help better prepare themselves for the political environment in China, and to assist in 
the successful development of their business in China. The complexity of its political system and operation 
system can be the make or the break of an Australian firm, in China. 
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